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Abstract. In modern global networks, principals usually have incomplete infor-
mation about each other. Therefore trust and reputation frameworks have been
recently adopted to maximise the security level by basing decision making on
estimated trust values for network peers. Existing models for trust and reputation
have ignored dynamic behaviours, or introduced ad hoc solutions. In this paper,
we introduce the HMM-based reputation model for network principals, where
the dynamic behaviour of each one is represented by a hidden Markov model
(HMM). We describe the elements of this novel reputation model. In particu-
lar we detail the representation of reputation reports. We also describe a mixing
scheme that efficiently approximates the behaviour of a trustee given multiple
reports about it from different sources.
1 Introduction
In modern global networks, the principals have incomplete information about each
other. Therefore it is a challenging problem for a principal to take decisions regarding
interactions with others. One approach that has recently adopted is to base these deci-
sions upon a level of ‘trust’ associated with each network peer. We consider specifically
the probabilistic trust, where the trust in a peer (trustee) te is expressed as a probability
distribution over the potential outcomes of an interaction with te.
Many systems (e.g. [13, 4, 18, 5]) have adopted the so-called Beta model [11], where
the behaviour of a trustee te is modelled by a fixed rating θ approximating the proba-
bility that an interaction with te yields ‘success’. This probability is learnt from past
interactions with the trustee te. One limitation of the Beta-based systems is that they as-
sume a fixed probabilistic behaviour for each principal; that is for each principal, there
exists a fixed probability distribution over possible outcomes of its interactions. This
assumption is indeed not realistic in practice. For example the behaviour of a principal
can be significantly different when it is corrupted by an attacker.
As a step forward to handling dynamic behaviours, several papers, e.g. [11, 4, 19],
adopted the ‘decay’ principle which was first introduced in [11]. It aims at capturing
the recent behaviour of the trustee by letting older observations ‘decay’, so as to give
higher weight to recent interactions over older ones. However, we showed in [7] that the
decay principle is only useful when the trustee’s behaviour is highly stable, i.e, when
the probability distribution over the observables is unlikely to change.
For coping with this limitation, we introduced in [8] the foundations of a novel
HMM-based trust model to evaluate trust in trustees exhibiting dynamic behaviours. A
trustee is characterised by a set of (behavioural) states, each associated with a proba-
bility distribution over observable outcomes of interactions. It proceeds by performing
(unobservable) probabilistic state transitions, which in turn determine changes in the
statistical properties of the (observable) outcomes of interactions. These assumptions
are met exactly by representing the trustee with a finite-state hidden Markov model
(HMM) [17], called the ‘real’ model. In particular, the trustee’s state transitions are
hidden, and trusters observe only the outcomes of their interactions with it.
For evaluating the trust, past observations are used to learn the trustee’s behaviour,
and then predict the outcomes of future interactions. The key information for that is the
real predictive distribution, i.e., the probability of each potential outcome in the next
interaction between a truster and a trustee te, given the outcomes of past interactions.
Yet, since the real model λ for te is unknown, the truster can only estimate the real
predictive distribution. In our approach this is done using the Baum-Welch algorithm
[17] that yields an ‘approximation’ η of λ, and then use η to evaluate the so-called
estimated predictive distribution, which ultimately defines the truster’s trust in te.
In many cases, the sequence of direct observations available to the truster is not
sufficiently long to learn the behaviour of the trustee with a satisfactory accuracy. To
handle this shortage of information, the reputation information is used in the learning
process. This information is seen as reports - about the trustee - given by other principals
called reputation sources. These reports enrich the truster’s knowledge about the trustee
and therefore enhance the approximation of λ. This also implies a better estimate of the
predictive distribution. Thus the notion of reputation raises two main questions:
– Which representation is appropriate for a reputation report ?
– How are reports, from different sources, utilised to enhance estimations ?
Clearly, the answers depend on the assumptions made about the real model of the
trustee’s behaviour. For example, in systems based on the Beta reputation model and its
extensions (e.g., [11, 10, 14]), a reputation report consists of the count of each outcome
experienced by its source in its interactions with the trustee. Multiple reputation reports
from different sources are therefore mixed by adding up the corresponding counts of
outcomes. This is not so easy in our case, where we must take into account that ob-
servations seen by different sources could correspond to different (hidden) states of the
trustee, and can not therefore be summed together. In fact, this is a major technical
challenge we face, one which demands a new approach.
In this paper we introduce a reputation model that matches the ‘dynamic’ nature
of the trustee’s behaviour. This model answers the above two questions when the be-
haviour is represented by an HMM, and therefore completes the basic HMM-based
trust model of [8] with a reputation handling mechanism. We also point to experimental
evidence, through simulations, in support of our model. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first trust-and-reputation model for multi-state, dynamic systems. Thus, it
provides the first complete answer to the research challenge launched in [14].
Structure of the paper. The next section concisely introduces hidden Markov mod-
els. In Section 3 we recall the basic model of HMM-based trust, whilst in Section 4 we
detail the elements of our HMM-based reputation model. Section 5 sketches an exper-
imental analysis of our reputation model against some of its predecessors. Finally, we
conclude our results in Section 6. For reason of space we have omitted the proofs from
the body of the paper. The interested reader can find them in the appendix.
2 Hidden Markov Models (HMMs)
A Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [1] is a probabilistic model essentially based on a
notion of system state. Underlying any HMM there is a Markov chain modelling (prob-
abilistically) system’s transitions between a set of states. Each state in this chain is
associated with a particular probability distribution over the set of possible outcomes
(observables). The output of an HMM is a sequence of outcomes where each outcome is
sampled according to the probability distribution of the underlying state. In the follow-
ing, we denote the state of the HMM and the outcome at time t by qt and ot respectively.
Definition 1 (hidden Markov model). A (discrete) hidden Markov model (HMM)
is a tuple λ = (S ,V,pi, A, B) where S = {1, 2, . . . ,N} is a finite set of states; V =
{z1, z2, . . . , zK} is a finite set of possible observables; pi is a distribution on S , the initial
distribution; A : S×S → [0, 1] is the state transition matrix, with Ai j = P (qt+1 = j | qt = i)
and
∑
j∈S Ai j = 1; and B : S × V → [0, 1] is the emission matrix, with Bi(zk) =
P (ot = zk | qt = i), ∑zk∈V Bi(zk) = 1.
As an example, Figure 1 shows a two-state HMM with the observation set {s, f}, where
transitions 1 7→ 2 and 2 7→ 1 have probabilities 0.1, 0.12 respectively. The probabilities
of self-transitions 1 7→ 1 and 2 7→ 2 are therefore 0.9, 0.88 respectively. The other
parameters pi, B are shown.
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kk
pi1 = 0.5
B(1, s) = 0.95
B(1, f) = 0.05 V = {s, f}
pi2 = 0.5
B(2, s) = 0.05
B(2, f) = 0.95
Fig. 1. Example Hidden Markov Model.
HMMs provide the computational trust community with several obvious advan-
tages: they are widely used in scientific applications, and come equipped with efficient
algorithms for computing the probabilities of events and for parameter estimation [17].
It is worth noticing that HMMs are a generalisation of the Beta model [11] to a multi-
state model. In fact, representing the behaviour of a trustee te by an HMM λ provides,
for each state j of te, a distribution B j over candidate observables V .
According to Definition 1 of HMM, the probability of a sequence of outcomes h =
o1 o2 · · · oT given an HMM λ is given by the following equation.
P(h | λ) =
∑
q1,...,qT∈S
pi(q1) · Bq1 (o1) · Aq1q2 · Bq2 (o2) · · · AqT−1qT · BqT (oT ). (1)
The above probability is evaluated efficiently by the forward-backward algorithm ([17]),
which evaluates the above probability inductively on the time t where 1 ≤ t ≤ T .
In our work we assume that utilised HMMs are ergodic. This corresponds to de-
manding that the Markov chain underlying an HMM is irreducible and aperiodic (c.f. [9,
15, 3]). An HMM is irreducible if each state is reachable (with non-zero probability)
from every other one. It is aperiodic if it has at least one aperiodic state. A state i is
aperiodic if it does not recur with a cyclic period, that is if the greatest common divisor
of times t > 0 such that P(q1+t = i | q1 = i) > 0 is 1. To guarantee aperiodicity it is
sufficient that one state has a self-transition with non-zero probability. Such conditions
are not overly restrictive for practical systems and typical applications.
2.1 Baum-Welch algorithm
Given a fixed set S of states and a fixed set V of observables, the Baum-Welch (BW)
algorithm [2, 17] iteratively finds an HMM η which maximises the probability P(h | η)
of a given sequence h. This iterative algorithm starts with an initial HMM η′ having
parameters pi′, A′, and B′. Then at each iteration, the a priori HMM η′ is refined to
obtain a posteriori HMM η with parameters pi, A, and B. These parameters are evalu-
ated by mathematical equations which we here summarise only informally by means of
Equations (2), (3), and (4), respectively.
pii = the probability of being in state i at time (t = 1). (2)
Ai j =
expected number of transitions from state i to state j
expected number of transitions from state i
. (3)
Bi (zk) =
expected number of times in state i and observing symbol zk
expected number of times in state i
. (4)
In the above equations, the expected values are computed given the sequence h of obser-
vations, and the probability distributions defined by the a priori model η′. The resulting
a posteriori model becomes the a priori one for the next iteration. The algorithm stops
when the a priori and a posteriori models have the same parameters. More details about
this algorithm can be found in [17]. One limitation of this algorithm is that it only
converges to a local maxima for the probability function rather than the global one.
3 Hmm-based trust model
The HMM-based trust model [8] is based on the assumption that the behaviour of the
trustee te is dynamic. This ‘unknown’ behaviour is modelled by an HMM λ, called the
‘real’ model of te. Since λ is generally unknown, each truster tr approximates it by a
finite-states HMM η, which we call the ‘approximate’ model of te.
In this approximation (learning) process, the truster tr uses past outcomes of its
direct interactions with te as follows. Given a sequence h of outcomes of direct interac-
tions between tr and te, the truster tr applies the BW-algorithm [2, 17] to h. As described
earlier, this algorithm yields an HMM that maximises the probability of h, and there-
fore defines the required approximate model η of te. We remark here that the size of η
is fixed by the truster, and represents the approximation level of the trustee’s behaviour.
Using the in-hand approximate model η for te, the truster tr can estimate a probabil-
ity distribution over possible outcomes of its next interaction with te. This distribution,
is called an ‘estimated’ predictive distribution of te (from tr’s point of view), and rep-
resents the trust of tr in te. Actually, this distribution is meant to be an ‘estimate’ for
the ‘real’ predictive distribution which is determined by the real model λ of the trustee.
The quality of this estimation is quantified by the difference between the ‘real’ and
‘estimated’ predictive distributions as follows.
Estimation error. The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [12, 6] is an appropriate mea-
sure for the difference between distributions. It has an information-theoretic flavour,
and is technically understood as a measure for the lost information when a probability
distribution is approximated by another. In our case, we write the real and estimated
predictive distributions as P(.) and H(.) respectively. The KL-divergence from P(.) to
H(.) is called the ‘estimation error’ and is defined as follows.
DKL
(
P(.) || H(.)) = ∑
z∈V
P(z) log
(
P(z)
H(z)
)
. (5)
Note that the above estimation error is specific to a pair of distributions corresponding
to a particular sequence of outcomes. Thus, we evaluate the quality of our trust model
as the average over all possible sequences. This average is the expected value of above
divergence, and therefore is referred to as the ‘expected estimation error’.
4 Hmm-reputation model
Now we describe our proposed reputation model, which enhances the trust evaluation
using supplementary feedback reports about the trustee. This model consists of two
main components: a formalism of reputation reports exchanged between the network
peers; and a mixing scheme which uses multiple reputation reports about a trustee te to
evaluate the trust in te. As this trust is an estimated predictive distribution, our goal is to
design those components such that the expected estimation error, described in Section
3 is minimised.
We start by linking the expected estimation error (for a trustee te) to the sequences of
outcomes observed by all reputation sources. Let h be a sequence of outcomes resulting
from past interactions between a trustee te and a single reputation source. Let also λ be
the unknown real model of te. It is shown in [8] that with any approximate model η, the
expected estimation error converges (as the length T of h grows) to the following limit
which we refer to as the asymptotic estimation error.
Error
(
λ,Hη
)
= C (λ) − H (λ, η) , (6)
where C (λ) = limT→∞ E
[
log P (oT+1 | qT , λ)], H (λ, η) = limT→∞ E [log P (oT+1 | h, η)].
In the language of information theory, −C (λ) is the expected entropy of the real pre-
dictive distribution determined by λ (the real model); and −H (λ, η) is the expected
cross-entropy between the real and estimated predictive distributions where the latter is
determined by both λ and η. By the asymptotic properties of ergodic HMMs [1, Theo-
rem 3.2], the log probability of any T -length observation sequence h, generated by λ, is
related to H (λ, η) as follows.
(1/T ) log P (h | η) a.s.→ H (λ, η) , (7)
that is, the left-hand term converges almost surely (with probability 1) to H (λ, η) as
T → ∞. Now consider the interactions between a trustee te and a set of reputation
sources M = {1 , 2, . . . , M} until a certain time instant. For every reputation source
u ∈ M, let hu be the sequence of outcomes observed by u. Let also Tu be the length of
hu. By Eq. (7), the average of the quantities (1/Tu) log P(hu | η) over the elements ofM
approximates H (λ, η). Thus, minimising the asymptotic estimation error, expressed by
(6), amounts to choosing the approximate model η that maximises such an average, i.e.
choosing the approximate model η that satisfies the following equation.
η = argmax
Rn
G
(
h1, h2, . . . , hM | Rn
)
, (8)
whereG
(
h1, h2, . . . , hM | Rn
)
is an objective function whose value depends on an n-state
HMM Rn. This objective function is defined as
G
(
h1, h2, . . . , hM | Rn
)
=
∑
u∈M
(1/Tu) log P (hu | Rn) . (9)
Maximising the above objective function requires full access to all the sequences hu.
However, it is not practical for principals to exchange their entire observed sequences
because each one of these sequences gets longer over time. Therefore we alternatively
maximise a tight lower bound for this function. For doing so, we assume that each
reputation source u uses its own observation sequence hu to learn an ‘a priori’ approx-
imate HMM ηu for the trustee. In terms of the a priori HMMs and other variables, the
following lemma provides the required lower bound for the objective function.
Lemma 1. Let M = {1, 2, . . . ,M} be a set of reputation sources. For all u ∈ M, let
hu and ηu = (S ,V,piu, Au, Bu) be, respectively, the sequence of outcomes observed by
u, and the corresponding a priori HMM. For any sequence q of states, let P (q | hu, ηu)
denote the probability of q given hu and ηu. Thus, it holds for every a posteriori HMM
η = (S ,V,pi, A, B) that
G
(
h1, h2, . . . , hM | η
)
≥
∑
u∈M
(1/Tu)Q (ηu, hu, η) +
∑
u∈M
(1/Tu)R (ηu, hu) ,
where Q (ηu, hu, η) =
∑
q
P (q | hu, ηu) log P (hu, q | η) , (10)
R (ηu, hu) = −
∑
q
P (q | hu, ηu) log P (q | hu, ηu) ; (11)
and the equality holds when η = η1 = η2 = · · · = ηM .
Lemma 1 provides a lower bound for G
(
h1, h2, . . . , hM | η
)
given any a posteriori model
η. Note that this bound is tight in the sense that it is equal to the objective function
when the a priori models ηu are all equal to the a posteriori model η. Thus, we set our
objective in the following to compute the optimal a posteriori model η∗ which we define
as the one maximising the above lower bound. That is,
η∗ = argmax
η
∑
u∈M
(1/Tu)Q (ηu, hu, η) +
∑
u∈M
(1/Tu)R (ηu, hu)
 . (12)
We will show that a truster wanting to compute η∗ needs to collect only certain statistics
about every observation sequence hu, rather than the entire sequence. For fixed sets of
states S and observables V , let the sequence of outcomes observed by the reputation
source u be hu = ou1 o
u
2 . . . o
u
Tu
, where out is the outcome at time t. Similarly, let q
u =
qu1 q
u
2 . . . q
u
Tu
be the (hidden) sequence of states underlying the observed sequence hu.
The optimal a posteriori HMM η∗ in (12) is computed by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Given a set M of reputation sources, the parameters of the optimal a
posteriori HMM η∗ = (S ,V,pi∗, A∗, B∗), are given by the following equations.
pi∗i =
∑
u∈M
1
Tu
P
(
qu1 = i | hu, ηu
)
∑
u∈M
1
Tu
, (13)
A∗i j =
∑
u∈M
1
Tu
∑Tu
t=2 P
(
qut−1 = i, q
u
t = j | hu, ηu
)
∑
u∈M
1
Tu
∑Tu
t=2 P
(
qut−1 = i | hu, ηu
) , (14)
B∗i (zk) =
∑
u∈M
∑Tu
t=1, out =zk
P
(
qut = i | hu, ηu
)
∑
u∈M
1
Tu
∑Tu
t=1 P
(
qut = i | hu, ηu
) . (15)
In the context of the BW-algorithm [17, 16], P (qt = i | h, η), the probability of visiting
state i at time t given an observation sequence h and an HMM η is denoted by the
variable γt(i). Also P (qt−1 = i, qt = j | h, η), the probability of visiting states i and j at
times t − 1 and t respectively is denoted by the variable ξt−1(i, j). In the same manner,
we use the variables γut (i) and ξ
u
t−1(i, j) to denote the probabilities P
(
qut = i | hu, ηu
)
and
P
(
qut−1 = i, q
u
t = j | hu, ηu
)
, respectively. Using these variables, (13-15) can be written
in shorter forms as follows.
pi∗i =
∑
u∈M
1
Tu
γu1(i)∑
u∈M
1
Tu
, A∗i j =
∑
u∈M
1
Tu
∑Tu
t=2 ξ
u
t−1(i, j)∑
u∈M
1
Tu
∑Tu
t=2 γ
u
t−1(i)
, B∗i (zk) =
∑
u∈M
1
Tu
∑Tu
t=1, out =zk
γut (i)∑
u∈M
1
Tu
∑Tu
t=1 γ
u
t (i)
.
From these formulae we notice that the computation of η∗ does not require full knowl-
edge about the observation sequences hu, where u ∈ M, but only some statistical func-
tions of these sequences computed ‘locally’ in individual reputation sources.
γ¯u1 =
[
γ¯u1(1) γ¯
u
1(2) . . . γ¯
u
1(N)
]
, where γ¯u1(i) =
1
Tu
γu1(i)
γ¯uTu =
[
γ¯uTu (1) γ¯
u
Tu (2) . . . γ¯
u
Tu (N)
]
, where γ¯uTu (i) =
1
Tu
γuTu (i)
γ¯u =
[
γ¯u(1) γ¯u(2) . . . γ¯u(N)
]
, where γ¯u(i) =
1
Tu
Tu−1∑
t=1
γut (i)
ξ¯
u
=

ξ¯
u(1, 1) ξ¯u(1, 2) . . . ξ¯u(1,N)
ξ¯
u(2, 1) ξ¯u(2, 2) . . . ξ¯u(2,N)
... . . .
. . .
...
ξ¯
u(N, 1) ξ¯u(N, 2) . . . ξ¯u(N,N)
 , where ξ¯
u(i, j) =
1
Tu
Tu∑
t=2
ξut−1(i, j)
ω¯u =

ω¯u(1, 1) ω¯u(1, 2) . . . ω¯u(1,K)
ω¯u(2, 1) ω¯u(2, 2) . . . ω¯u(2,K)
... . . .
. . .
...
ω¯u(N, 1) ω¯u(N, 2) . . . ω¯u(N,K)
 , where ω¯
u(i, k) =
1
Tu
Tu∑
t=1, out =zk
γut (i)
Fig. 2. The elements of an HMM-based reputation report
It is essential to ensure that the a priori HMMs ηu have the same set S of states
(as required by Lemma 1 and Theorem 1). Therefore we define a parameter η¯ for the
reputation protocol to be an initial N-state HMM. The parameter η¯ is shared by all
principals and is regarded as the ‘default’ trustee’s behaviour which is refined through
the learning process to ηu according to the sequence of outcomes hu seen by u.
Thus, we describe the HMM based reputation model as follows. Using η¯ as an
initial HMM, each reputation source u applies the BW-algorithm to its own observa-
tions hu about the trustee te. This learning process, performed by u, yields an HMM
ηu approximating the behaviour of te (from u’s point of view) and also the variables
γut (i), ξ
u
t (i, j) for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tu, and all i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N}. In terms of these vari-
ables, every reputation source u constructs its reputation report about te as the tuple(
Tu , γ¯u1 , γ¯
u
Tu
, γ¯u , ξ¯
u
, ω¯u
)
. While Tu is clearly the length of hu, each other element in
this tuple (report) is basically a matrix defined in Figure 2.
Now we describe our reputation mixing scheme. Suppose that multiple reports about
te, from a setM of reputation sources, are available to a truster tr. Note that these reports
include the one constructed by tr itself about te. Using the elements of these reports, tr
computes the optimal a posteriori HMM η∗ of te as follows
pi∗i =
∑
u∈M
γ¯u1(i)∑
u∈M
1
Tu
, A∗i j =
∑
u∈M
ξ¯u(i, j)∑
u∈M
γ¯u(i)
, B∗i (zk) =
∑
u∈M
ω¯u(i, k)∑
u∈M
(
γ¯u(i) + γ¯uTu (i)
) .
Using η∗ and the past observations htr (seen by tr), the trust of tr in te is evaluated as
an estimated predictive distribution, i.e. the probability - given htr and η∗ - of every
possible outcome zk ∈ V for a new interaction with te. This distribution is expressed as
P(zk | htr, η∗) = P(zk, htr | η∗)/P(htr | η∗) ∀zk ∈ V.
In the above equation, the probabilities on the right side are defined by Eq. 1, and
efficiently evaluated by the forward-backward algorithm ([17]).
5 Experimental evaluation
To evaluate our reputation model experimentally, we simulate an HMM λ representing a
trustee te. We consider two partners: tr and rs. Each interaction between te and a partner
is simulated by allowing λ to make a state transition, and produce an observation in one
partner. Over time we allow the reputation source rs to serve a reputation report about
te to the truster tr, which combines it with its local trust information to produce a new
estimated predictive distribution for te. We then evaluate the expected estimation error,
defined in Section 3, using Monte-Carlo approach (see, e.g., [3]).
Let λ be a 4-state HMM representing a ‘stable’ behaviour, where the probability
of making self-transition is high (0.9), and other transitions are equally likely. Let the
observation alphabet V = {1, 2}, where the emission matrix is
Bλ =

1.0 0.0
0.7 0.3
0.3 0.7
0.0 1.0
 (16)
At each interaction with te, we assume the tr and rs are equally likely (with probabil-
ity 0.2) to be te’s partner, while it remains a probability 0.6 that any other principal is
the partner. Figure 3, shows the impact of using the HMM-based reputation model on
the expected estimation error. The graph on the left compares the HMM trust model
with and without reports from reputation sources. The higher curve shows the estima-
tion error resulting from using only tr’s observations (1 report). The lower curve shows
the error when tr uses also the reputation report collected from rs (2 reports). The im-
provement resulting from mixing in the reputation report is indicated by the vertical gap
between the curves. Observe that this becomes less significant as the total number of
interactions grows. This is because in the case of long sequences, the observations made
individually by tr tend to be sufficient to learning the trustee’s behaviour with accuracy.
With the same simulation framework, the right-hand side of Figure 3 compares the
expected estimation errors of our model against the Beta reputation model. Observe
that for a relatively low number of total interactions T , the beta model outperforms the
HMM reputation model by exhibiting a lower expected estimation error. In this case,
the combined length of the observation sequences is not sufficient to capture the ‘dy-
namicity’ of te’s behaviour. As a result, the learning algorithm working on such input
produces a low-quality approximate behaviour HMM η. Hence the large estimation
error compared to using Beta reputation reports. However, when the number of inter-
actions grows and the sequence become long enough to compute a good estimate, the
Fig. 3. The expected estimation error using the HMM-based reputation model
HMM reputation model exhibits a substantially lower error than the Beta model. The
Beta model falls short here: since it ignores te’s dynamic behaviour and only learns an
‘average’ probability distribution over possible outcomes, it can not keep the expected
estimation level low. It is also apparent from Figure 3, that incorporating a decay fac-
tor in the Beta model (viz., 0.9 in the example) reduces the expected estimation error.
Further details about the effect of decay can be found in [7].
6 Conclusion
We proposed a model for reputation which completes our basic HMM-based trust model
in [8] and yields the first trust-and-reputation model for multi-state, dynamic systems.
The reputation model enhances the quality and reliability of trust judgements and their
evaluation process by using feedback information about the trustee in the form of rep-
utation reports. The latter are a ‘digest’ of a principal’s interactions with the trustee,
conceptually nothing but an abstraction on the simple idea of ratings given by reputa-
tion sources about trustees. The model provides mixing equations which can be used by
the truster to combine reputation reports collected from different sources, together with
its own trust information, in order to evaluate its trust in the trustee.
We used the same experimental approach previously used in [8] to evaluate and
compare trust models in terms of the expected estimation error. This allows us to investi-
gate the impact of the HMM-reputation model on trust evaluation, as well as to compare
this model against its predecessors. We found that the estimation error is significantly
reduced when multiple reputation reports are used in the trust evaluation process. We
also discussed how the improvement due to reputation reports gets less significant as the
total number of interactions with the trustee gets larger. This is because a larger number
of total interactions with the trustee implies that the single sequence experienced by the
truster itself tends to provide a sufficient accurate basis to learn the trustee’s behaviour.
A comparison with the Beta reputation model, using the same number of reputation
sources, yielded that the Beta reputation model outperforms our HMM-based reputa-
tion when the total number T of interactions is relatively small. As T gets larger, the
HMM-based reputation model gradually improves in terms of the estimation error, and
eventually outperforms the Beta model very significantly. This is because longer ob-
servation sequences imply more accurate approximate models of the trustee’s dynamic
behaviour, information which, in contrast, the Beta model ignores altogether.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
For any given hu, let q denote the random sequence of states underlying hu. We have
log P (hu | η) = log
∑
q
P (hu, q | η)
 = log
∑
q
P (q | hu, ηu) P (h
u, q | η)
P (q | hu, ηu)

= log
(
Eq
[
P (q, hu | η)
P (q | hu, ηu)
∣∣∣∣∣ hu, ηu]) ≥(1) Eq [log ( P (q, hu | η)P (q | hu, ηu)
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣ hu, ηu
]
=
∑
q
P (q | hu, ηu) log P (q, h
u | η)
P (q | hu, ηu)
=
∑
q
P (q | hu, ηu) log P (q, hu | η) −
∑
q
P (q | hu, ηu) log P (q | hu, ηu)
= Q (ηu, hu, η) + R (ηu, hu)
The inequality (1) is obtained by applying Jensen’s inequality (see e.g. [6, Theorem
2.6.2]) to the log function. The equality holds when η = ηu. It easily follows that.∑
u
1
Tu
log P (hu | η) ≥
∑
u
1
Tu
Q (ηu, hu, η) +
∑
u
1
Tu
R (ηu, hu)
where the equality holds when η = η1 = η2 = · · · = ηM . Using the definition (9)
of G
(
h1, h2, . . . , hM | η
)
to substitute the summation in the left hand side of the above
equation, the proof is complete. uunionsq
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Note that the summation
∑
u
1
Tu
R (ηu, hu) is independent of η. The maximisation in Eq.
(12) amounts, therefore, to maximising
∑
u
1
Tu
Q (ηu, hu, η). Let hu = ou1, ou2, . . . , ouTu de-
note the observation sequence observed by reputation source u.
Let also qu = qu1, q
u
2, . . . , q
u
Tu
denote the (hidden) sequence of states underlying the ob-
servation sequence hu. We start by expressing log P (hu, qu | η) in terms of the parame-
ters of η as follows.
log P (hu, qu | η) = log piqu1 +
Tu∑
t=2
log Aqut−1qut +
Tu∑
t=1
log Bqut
(
out
)
(17)
where pii denotes the probability that the initial state (qu1) is i. Ai j is the probability of
transition from state i to state j. Bi (zk) is the probability of observing the outcome zk
at state i. Refer to the description of the HMM elements in Section 2 for more details
about these notations.
Substituting Expression (17) in (10), the function Q (ηu, hu, η) can be written as
follows.
Q (ηu, hu, η) =
N∑
i=1
P
(
qu1 = i | hu, ηu
)
log pii +
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Tu∑
t=2
P
(
qut−1 = i, q
u
t = j | hu, ηu
)
log Ai j +
N∑
i=1
K∑
k=1
Tu∑
t=1
P
(
qut = i | hu, ηu
)
δ
(
out , zk
)
log Bi (zk)
(18)
where N is the number of states, K is the number of possible observation symbols, and
the δ-function δ
(
out , zk
)
is defined as:
δ (ot, zk) =
{
1 if ot = zk
0 otherwise (19)
Now we are ready to expressing the sum
∑M
u=1
1
Tu
Q (ηu, hu, η) in (12) by scaling Eq.
(18) by 1/Tu, and then summing over the available reputation sources {1, 2, . . . ,M}. For
convenience, we write the resulting sum as follows.
M∑
u=1
1
Tu
Q (ηu, hu, η) = Qpi (pi) +
N∑
i=1
QAi (Ai) +
N∑
i=1
QBi (Bi) (20)
where pi = [pi1, pi2, . . . , piN] is the vector representing the initial state probability dis-
tribution, Ai = [Ai1, Ai2, . . . , AiN] is the vector representing the probability distribution
over state transitions from state i to other states, and Bi = [Bi(z1), Bi(z2), . . . , Bi(zK)] is
the vector representing the emission probability distribution over outcomes given state i.
The functions Qpi(pi), QAi (Ai), and QBi (Bi) in the above equation are defined as follows.
Qpi(pi) =
N∑
i=1
 M∑
u=1
1
Tu
P
(
qu1 = i | hu, ηu
) log pii (21)
QAi (Ai) =
N∑
j=1
 M∑
u=1
1
Tu
Tu∑
t=2
P
(
qut−1 = i, q
u
t = j | hu, ηu
) log Ai j (22)
QBi (Bi) =
K∑
k=1
 M∑
u=1
1
Tu
Tu∑
t=1
P
(
qut = i | hu, ηu
)
δ
(
out , zk
) log Bi (zk) (23)
Observe that each term in Equation (20) is a function of a probability distribution
which parametrises the HMM η. These distributions (pi, Ai, Bi ∀i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N) are
independent of each other, that is the choice of one of them does not affect the choice
of the others. Therefore the overall sum (20) is maximised by maximising each term in
(20) separately. Observe furthermore that each of equations (21),(22), and (23) is in the
following form.
F (y1, y2, . . . , yV ) =
V∑
v=1
wv log yv where
V∑
v=1
yv = 1 (24)
Using the Lagrange multiplier technique for optimising a function subject to a con-
straint, the constrained function F defined above can be easily proved to have a global
maximum at the point (y¯1, y¯2, . . . , y¯V ), where y¯v is given by
y¯v =
wv∑V
v=1 wv
Using the above fact, the parameters of the optimal a posteriori model η∗ are given
as follows.
pi∗i =
∑M
u=1
1
Tu
P
(
qu1 = i | hu, ηu
)
∑M
u=1
1
Tu
A∗i j =
∑M
u=1
1
Tu
∑Tu
t=2 P
(
qut−1 = i, q
u
t = j | hu, ηu
)
∑M
u=1
1
Tu
∑Tu
t=2 P
(
qut−1 = i | hu, ηu
)
B∗i (zk) =
∑M
u=1
∑Tu
t=1 P
(
qut = i | hu, ηu
)
δ
(
out , zk
)∑M
u=1
1
Tu
∑Tu
t=1 P
(
qut = i | hu, ηu
)
uunionsq
